Institutional Reform in Galapagos 2010

Institutional Reform in Galapagos

Graham Watkins and Johannah Barry

January 2010

Introduction

In 2007, the Government of Ecuador and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) recognized that the direction of development in the Galapagos was not sustainable and directly in conflict with conservation.  The joint acknowledgement of failure to preserve and protect this extraordinary world treasure led to its inclusion on the World Heritage Sites in Danger roster.   This recognition was a turning point in the history of the islands; it was an unprecedented call for all actors to change the direction of management and development in order to ensure a sustainable future that contributes to the conservation of the archipelago.  In some ways, this call to action mirrored the call made in the 1950s by scientists and conservationists that led to the formation of the Charles Darwin Foundation, the establishment of the Galapagos National Park and the conservation of key endangered species in the islands.  The problem now is that the threats are greater, more complex and more difficult to manage than the threats of 50 years ago.

Galapagos has been in crisis since the early 1990s when tourism-driven economic growth dramatically altered the political, social, cultural and ecological realities of the archipelago.  Economic interests attracted immigrants, drove over-harvests, increased political patronage, sparked conflict and produced new ecological risks.  The early years of the 1990s were marred by severe and violent conflicts, including multiple takeovers of Park and Station property (one park warden shot), mass slaughter of over 80 tortoises on Isabela Island, and  public threats against tourists broadcast over the radio by  local political leaders.  This troubling level of violence and chaos led to the development of the 1998 Special Law for Galapagos.  The law, in its spirit, attempted to knit together seemingly disparate visions and stakeholder priorities, seeking to conserve ecological and evolutionary processes and mandate local involvement in decision-making.

Unfortunately implementation of key components of the law, so crucial for sustainable human development, has been weak.  The Special Law spoke to sweeping educational reform, strict controls on migration, and wider and more genuine involvement of residents in public policy and economic development.  However, fragile leadership and resistance to change from many sectors have impeded action.  The education sector, long protected by a strong union, showed little interest in undertaking the task of significant educational reform.  The tourism industry, which has profited from pricing structures long outdated, was reluctant to agree to fees and concession prices that reflected today’s dollars.  Builders and outside investors, correctly sensing a chaotic and patchwork system of zoning regulations, had little motivation to insist on a streamlined regulatory system which would in all likelihood impact their currently untrammeled access to land and resources.   Market forces have disproportionately influenced decision making and outdated fiscal polices, historically directed at subsidizing  early colonization, have confounded efforts to ensure a conservation-centered approach.

This article examines the capacities within Galapagos – laws, organizations, and leadership –which were party to addressing the visionary aspect of the 1998 Special Law for Galapagos and  which have participated in its failure.  Solutions to the seemingly intractable management situation in Galapagos require a particular ingenuity unique to Galapagos.   We suggest that the same fluid management structures and opportunistic endeavors which led to Galapagos to its current status as a World Heritage Site in Danger may also be the key to a set of legal, cultural and economic policies which will protect Galapagos into the future.

Governance in Galapagos

The ability to describe and move forward a vision comes from an organic process in which personal insights and perspectives align, in some cases serendipitously, with the needs and aspirations of a larger, interested group.  Moving Galapagos towards a sustainable future will be the result of enlightened and charismatic leadership.

Governance refers to the institutions, either designated by law or ordinance to participate or which arise or evolve to “fill gaps” which have both the authority and responsibility to carry out specific tasks of public policy.  There are over fifty central government organizations and nine local government organizations with responsibilities in Galapagos. Only some of these are tied into a centralized framework for decision making, and their presence creates satellite governing structures and frameworks in which decisions get made (and sometimes unmade).  Along with these governmental institutions, there is a growing network of civil society organizations (labor, education, religious) which operate in Galapagos and influence, but do not significantly alter, political decision-making (with the possible exception of fishing cooperatives which have been often used as political weapons during local elections). 

 There are three institutions which have which have emerged as competent, albeit overburdened, agents with political and intellectual heft.  Of particular interest is that two of them do not have specific public policy responsibilities but have emerged as intellectual leaders (and occasional lightening rods) in Galapagos politics.  The third, a management institution created by the Government of Ecuador, is now in the process of being dismantled in its current form, but its function will remain as part of a permanent management design.  

Charles Darwin Foundation for the Galapagos Islands

The oldest institution in Galapagos with a continuous history of management and technical expertise is the Charles Darwin Foundation.  Oddly, while its mandate as an advisory institution to the Government of Ecuador, and its foreign, independent legal status would preclude directive management, its influence on public policy direction and intent is unmistakable. 

In the 1950s, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and other moved forward to establish a scientific research station in the Galapagos Islands. The “Charles Darwin Research Station” served as a catalyst for multiple policy and legislative changes in the Galapagos including in the late 1960s the strengthening of the Galapagos National Park Service and the development of tourism.  Arguably, the initiative to establish the Charles Darwin Research Station and to strengthen the Galapagos National Park Service has been the most important influences on the present state of Galapagos.

The primary purpose, at establishment, of the Charles Darwin Research Station and the Galapagos National Park Service was to address research and conservation issues in the Islands.  The CDF operates under an agreement, signed every 25 years and managed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which gives the CDF unusual access and voice within the conservation movement in Ecuador.  The CDF’s mandate is to provide technical advice to the Government of Ecuador on the management of the Galapagos National Park and in this way, CDF has a powerful, nonpartisan, influence on conservation decision-making.

Its long, uninterrupted presence in Galapagos, largely due to its formal relationship with the Government of Ecuador and its financial viability (a result of funding streams independent of the government)  has provided the CDF and its work with significant visibility in the local, national, and international community.  This status has not been without its detractors.  While the CDF is represented in virtually all public fora, consulted in local and national decisions on conservation, and is a large economic presence in the islands, a  public opinion poll by Barber and Ospina (2008), reflected  CDF’s extremely low scores in the public’s confidence precisely for this financial independence and “sole”  commitment to conservation.  As respected an intellectual leader as the CDF is, reflected in its continuing, formal presence as a foreign agency under agreement  with the national government, it faces an uneasy relationship with the growing number of new residents who are indifferent and even hostile to conservation. 

Galapagos National Park Service

The Galapagos National Park Service was established six years after the Charles Darwin Foundation as is the government agency responsible for the management of the terrestrial and marine protected areas which constitute the Galapagos National Park.  This body is comprised of wildlife biologists and managers and is headed by a Director who is appointed by the President.  In past, this selection process has devolved into unfortunate political theater, with the park directorship becoming a political football tossed between political factions seeking access to the significant economic opportunities managed and determined by the Director.  

That being said, the Park has significant access to the international press, bi-lateral aid agencies, and a wide and engaged public which has been rallied on several significant occasions to put pressure on the central government to change policies and tactics.  The Park Service  is a major employer in Galapagos, but it is worth mentioning that the local and central government employs over ten times the number of people current employed by the Park (2100 vs. 250) (Galapagos Report-2008). The Park is well financed, and enjoys a budget significantly larger than any park in South America and is closer to the budgets of the Great Barrier Reef and Yellowstone National Park (Epler, 2007)   In the final analysis, while the Park’s public image rises and falls with the resident’s perceptions of how Park management will immediately benefit them, the Park Service and its Director are central figures in Galapagos management and economic sustainability.

Galapagos National Institute

At the time of the Special Law, the Galapagos National Institute (INGALA) was created to assume responsibility for migration and development in Galapagos.  Establishing the Galapagos National Institute was an important first step and an indication that the central government understood the importance of a streamlined political body in Galapagos.  This body was intended to be responsive to the various economic and political interests in Galapagos through representation of those sectors on the INGALA Council.

INGALA bore the brunt of public disfavor soon after the Special Law was passed.  An institution created to carry out the implementation of the law, INGALA was woefully underfunded and minimally staffed.  The optimism which accompanied this sweeping legislation and the willingness that residents displayed in agreeing to modify or amend behavior related to conservation had its roots in what residents believed would be immediate and significant economic benefits.  When those benefits were not forthcoming, INGALA’s public image declined and Galapagos residents, according to the Barber/Ospina opinion poll, provided some of the harshest, negative feedback in terms of public trust and credibility. 

Despite the Galapagos public’s expressed unhappiness with INGALA, President Correa continues to rely on this institution to address critical Galapagos issues.  In 2007, he tasked INGALA  to take immediate stock of all aspects of growing human impact in Galapagos (migration, residency, illegal residents) and their biological outcomes (invasive species, land and resource use).  Added to INGALA’s directive was the task of determining how any and all measures to bring Galapagos back to a largely uncompromised system would be financed. 

Although imperfectly, the INGALA Council and assorted other actors in Galapagos responded quickly to the demands of the central government.  Within a year, a Total Control Plan for invasive species was developed and approved and a funding mechanism/endowment was capitalized with Ecuadorian Government funding, external private funding, and bi-lateral funding.  Government institutions within Galapagos are scheduled to  be simplified and streamlined and many illegal or “ irregular” residents have already been returned to the mainland under a successful, locally initiated buyout program.  At the time of this writing, the central government is rethinking the “shape” but not the function of INGALA as part of a streamlined management system.  One possible scenario is to develop a planning entity within a strengthened government office.  The idea of a Galapagos-based management capacity responsible to the central government, with streamlined responsibilities, will continue in Galapagos

The Galapagos Special Law of 1998

In the history of Galapagos, the establishment of new institutions and organizations has been ad hoc to resolve particular issues rather than based on a shared vision and a well defined strategic direction for the islands. Often, new institutions have been created to cater to particularly vocal special interests rather than based on a strategic objective.  While in any complex setting, decisions are made through institutions and formal (and informal) networks, Galapagos presents additional levels of complexity and unconventional processes. 

Galapagos is a special case within special cases – an island system with an associated protected area.  The special geographical and social characteristics of this isolated archipelago have given rise to alternative power and decision making structures, and have given an unusual level of autonomy and leadership to a small number of key players. It is this context that makes the development of the Special Law so remarkable.  Contrary to the usual process of negotiation between lawyers of powerful sectors , the Special Law was one of the first pieces of legislation to be prepared, from inception, through a participatory process in which all actors, many hostile to each others interest, were invited to take part.

In the early 1990s, UNESCO threatened to place the islands on the endangered list – and this resulted in the establishment of a Permanent Commission for Galapagos in 1994.  In the mid 1990s, a breakdown in the social order, reflected in hostile demonstrations against the Park and Station, shootings, and threats of violence against tourists (including a standoff between tour boats and fishing boats in the waters of Espanola)  led to the collaborative development of the 1998 Special Law for Galapagos.  The new Law reflected the multiple interests in Galapagos including tourism, conservation, research, and fishing and mandated local involvement in decision making, immigration regulation, and educational reform. The law also, commendably, created the Galapagos Marine Reserve, provided several fora for discussion and collaborative management, defined business reform, and established mechanisms to reduce the risks from invasive species.

Conceived and enacted at a time of both economic vigor in Ecuador and optimism that a group of thoughtful actors could influence an otherwise dire trajectory, The Special Law prioritized conserving ecological and evolutionary processes and, to this end, dictated the application of the precautionary principle.  To be specific, any legislative action would be required to “anticipate” harm and to demonstrate that the consequence of legislation would not damage or adversely affect critical ecological activity.  The Law also mandated local involvement in decision making, increased local equity in business development, the control of invasive species, and educational reform.  Conflict, unsustainable tourism growth, over harvests of fisheries, unregulated immigration, organizational instability, new invasive species, and failed educational reform mark the ten years since the approval of the Special Law.  This leads to the obvious question.  What went wrong?

After the Special Law

The 1998 Special Law was an important legal document in terms of the far reaching and visionary language with which it sought to create a new order in Galapagos.  That otherwise disengaged or even hostile parties would come together in earnest over two years to hammer out a comprehensive management plan might lead one to conclude that at long last, the entrepreneurial, frontier mentality of Galapagos had somehow been replaced with an enlightened self interest.  However, the uneven  implementation of the Special Law revealed that no such epiphany took place.  The Special Law, in its eagerness to comply with external forces assumed to be hostile to Ecuador’s national pride and world image, attempted to merge multiple visions for the future of the islands.  In some cases, these visions, which were not necessarily compatible, were not described in sufficient detail as to obviate any clear incompatibility. To the latter point - several things went wrong.

The implementation of the Special Law over the ensuing years drew attention to these incompatibilities. The preferential allocation of tourism rights to Galapagos residents was a politically and socially laudable goal but difficult to implement in terms of low volume high value tourism development.  Local residents had neither access to credit nor market access nor could they penetrate an entrenched private enterprise that controls the existing tourism concessions in the islands.

Enhancing local agricultural production to minimize imports and so reduce the risk of invasive species while providing local employment was equally laudable – but difficult to implement when labor immigration is restricted and the costs of subsidized imported agricultural products are lower than those produced in the islands. Discussions within the Participatory Management Board created by the Special Law revealed the severe dichotomy between what conservationists termed artisanal fishing (small scale) and subsistence fishing – and the commercial extraction of lobster and sea cucumber; an incompatibility readily revealed through discussions of long lining and ultimately the need to establish “mother ships” to process sufficient volumes of pelagic species for export markets.

In essence, the Special Law could not be implemented because fundamental incompatibilities had not been fully resolved. This, in hindsight, is not surprising given the often diametrically opposed perspectives that had to be brought to the table to develop the Special Law. Perhaps the most enlightened mechanism in the Special Law was the establishment of the Participatory Management Board – ostensibly set up to resolve outstanding disagreements.  Unfortunately, the Board proved a huge disappointment because of its forced focus on fisheries as discussions on the far more critical tourism issues were avoided through legal and political maneuvering by powerful tourism companies. 

In its simplest terms, the most glaring omission of the Special Law was that it called for reduced immigration, greater benefits for residents, and the control of invasive species but made no inroads into changing the “status quo” within tourism. Rather than affect the primary economic source – established tourism – and its established political and economic power base, the Special Law moved Galapagos toward growth in marginal businesses in agriculture and fishing and enhancing benefit flows to locals through increased public sector expenditure; the subsequent growth of land based tourism was not surprising from an economic perspective.

The law aggregated complexity, increased an already bloated government bureaucracy, and created multiple opportunities for political influence and corruption.  The law created new organizations, and mandated different powers for existing organizations, that were then overlaid on the existing systems of national, regional, and local government. While the law enacted mechanisms for institutional coordination, including the INGALA Council and the Committee for Institutional Coordination, these mechanisms proved ineffective for the ten years from 1998. The organizational spider’s web of Galapagos became further complicated by national political instability – leading to constant turnover in Galapagos organizations concurrent with changes in the nation’s political leadership. The end result is that the law obfuscated the situation and through its own institutional complexity minimized the likelihood of effective implementation.

Moving Forward

The starting point for any process of change is to establish a clearly articulated vision for the future and define strong, centralized leadership.   Rather than disparate parties owning and acting on components of world view particular to their own sense of what Galapagos can offer - the case in the Galapagos of today - we assert that Galapagos requires a single overarching vision which has at its core an explicit recognition of the primacy of biodiversity conservation.  That said, an equally central component to this vision is the leadership to implement and keep alive this vision.

The word “vision” may strike some as either an arbitrary goal or, in the other extreme, a fanciful collection of beliefs.  It is neither.  It is an articulated and well understood trajectory, delineating the most desirable alternative future based on current and projected trends.  It is clear that a shared vision for the future of Galapagos does not exist – and this is a failing of the leadership in Galapagos. As an example, there is disagreement on the market focus, business structures, and regulatory frameworks required for sustainable tourism; there is also disagreement on the measures and tools required for the conservation of the islands. On the other hand, one major element of a Galapagos future is generally agreed upon - the need for educational reform; though, there is clearly disagreement within the education profession as to how to create reform. Once leadership is clarified, the primary task must be to articulate this future and the specific path to its realization.  In its absence, weak organizations will permit disparate interests to flourish leading to continued degradation of the social and ecological environment in the Galapagos. The participatory process of developing this vision will demand a great deal from the new Government Council for Galapagos – do the leadership skills or individuals exist for this transition towards consensus?

This agreed future state for Galapagos must be the basis for all subsequent actions. Some elements of that vision will be highly contentious, including how tourism businesses will be structured, the future role of agriculture and fishing, the required and most efficient government organizational structures, and the priorities for conservation action. Development of the new vision will therefore require substantial conflict management skills and leadership skills. Once constructed the vision will need to be effectively communicated to all involved parties – one tool for this is the planned revision of the 1998 Special Law for Galapagos. Unfortunately, however, it would seem that this revision is being undertaken in the vacuum of not having a shared vision for the islands – as a somewhat top-down process from central government. Given the opportunistic, entrepreneurial history of Galapagos it is unlikely that a top-down driven approach will meet with success in the long term.

The Special Law for Galapagos is now being rewritten and will be implemented in 2010.  Will Ecuadorian leadership, the new Government Council, act on behalf of the whole including national interests, think systemically and seek innovation and opportunity to transform conflicts so as to construct a new future?

Within the small communities which make up Galapagos, it is unlikely that we will find all of the leadership and other skills and talents required for creating a sustainable society and ensuring long term conservation. It is critically important to recognize the trade-off between, on one hand, ensuring provision of local benefits through employment and, on the other hand, in ensuring efficient organizational function. What is noteworthy is that the institutions which have been identified as critical to the well-functioning of Galapagos  - Galapagos National Park, the Charles Darwin Foundation, INGALA, have completely disparate roles.  Only the latter has an actual governance mandate, and yet the former two are critical players in long-term conservation decision making. 

What we may discover is that the fluid and adaptive nature of Galapagos also defines its most effective governance structure.  It may well be that the unique and occasionally inconvenient presence of national and international bodies, speaking independently but with authority and context, will be an important part of public policy in this archipelago.  Management, driven by science and biodiversity conservation, suggests that the Park will continue to play a critical role in decision making.  While this presence of science-based decision making may seem inconsistent with municipal governance, we recall that Galapagos is still a national park.  That essential management distinction calls for a framework that includes, in a viable and robust manner, the presence of parties unresponsive to (or largely disinterested in) economic development.

But finally, Galapagos has residents who have the right to live and prosper.  Those voices need to be heard and considered.  This would suggest that some governing structure with an effective planning and management arm capable of listening to these voices and devising policies that meld local opportunities and conservation. 

Change will be sustainable and long term if 1) a clear vision for the future is established, 2) this vision is effectively communicated, and 3) changes are implemented in the context of this vision. The fundamental aspects of this vision for the future of the islands should be encompassed in a clear measurable state policy for Galapagos. This policy should clearly establish limits to development and bind all levels of society.  The vision should clearly establish the base conditions under which resource extraction or tourism development should occur – including the demonstration of sustainability, open and transparent choice of businesses, and commitment to certification, respect for employees, local equity and environmental risk minimization. If we can achieve this then it is highly likely that there will be a Galapagos in 50 years that is better conserved than today.